Why Uniform Integrability Matters
Convergence in probability does not by itself control expectations: rare outcomes can have small probability but very large magnitude. Uniform integrability rules out this loss of mass in the tails. For martingales, the related class D condition requires this control not just at deterministic times, but across values taken at stopping times.
Work on a filtered probability space \((\Omega,\mathcal{F},(\mathcal{F}_t)_{t\ge0},\mathbb{P})\) carrying a standard Brownian motion \(B_t\). The results below concern integrable random variables and martingales; no stochastic integral is used. All equalities between random variables are understood to hold almost surely. An integrable random variable \(X\) satisfies \(\mathbb{E}|X|<\infty\).
Here and below, a stopping time \(\tau\) is a random time for which \(\{\tau\le t\}\in\mathcal{F}_t\) for every \(t\). Class D is stronger than requiring the deterministic-time family \(\{M_t\}\) to be UI: it also tests random times chosen using the observed history.
Uniform Integrability and Convergence in Mean
Proof. Write \(u(K)=\sup_n\mathbb{E}[|X_n|\mathbf{1}_{\{|X_n|>K\}}]\), so \(u(K)\to0\). We first control the tail of \(X\). From any subsequence of \(X_n\), convergence in probability permits extraction of a further subsequence \(X_{n_j}\) converging to \(X\) almost surely. For fixed \(K>0\), the pointwise inequality $$ |X|\mathbf{1}_{\{|X|>K\}}\le\liminf_{j\to\infty}|X_{n_j}|\mathbf{1}_{\{|X_{n_j}|>K\}} $$ holds. Indeed, on \(\{|X|>K\}\), convergence implies that \(|X_{n_j}|>K\) eventually, so the right side is \(|X|\); outside that event the left side is zero. Fatou's lemma gives \(\mathbb{E}[|X|\mathbf{1}_{\{|X|>K\}}]\le u(K)\). In particular, taking \(K\) sufficiently large makes this tail expectation finite and small; the part where \(|X|\le K\) is bounded by \(K\), so \(X\) is integrable.
For \(K>0\), let \(c_K(x)=\max(-K,\min(x,K))\). Then \(|x-c_K(x)|\le |x|\mathbf{1}_{\{|x|>K\}}\), and \(|c_K(x)|\le K\). Since \(c_K(X_n)\to c_K(X)\) in probability, for every \(\varepsilon>0\), $$ \mathbb{E}|c_K(X_n)-c_K(X)|\le \varepsilon+2K\,\mathbb{P}(|c_K(X_n)-c_K(X)|>\varepsilon). $$ For fixed \(K\), the limit superior as \(n\to\infty\) is at most \(\varepsilon\), and then letting \(\varepsilon\downarrow0\) shows that this expectation tends to zero. The triangle inequality therefore gives $$ \limsup_{n\to\infty}\mathbb{E}|X_n-X| \le u(K)+\mathbb{E}[|X|\mathbf{1}_{\{|X|>K\}}]\le 2u(K). $$ Let \(K\to\infty\); this proves \(L^1\) convergence. Finally, \(|\mathbb{E}[X_n]-\mathbb{E}[X]|\le\mathbb{E}|X_n-X|\to0\). \(\square\)
Worked Example: A Bounded Martingale Is Class D
Suppose \(M=(M_t)_{0\le t\le T}\) is a martingale with right-continuous paths, and \(|M_t|\le 3\) almost surely for every fixed \(t\). Show it is class D on \([0,T]\).
First, the bound holds for all times at once. Let \(N\) be the union of the null sets on which \(|M_t|>3\), taken over rational \(t\in[0,T]\) and \(t=T\). Then \(N\) is null, and by right continuity, \(|M_t(\omega)|\le3\) for every \(t\in[0,T]\) and every \(\omega\notin N\).
For any stopping time \(\tau\le T\), the stopped value satisfies \(|M_\tau|\le3\) almost surely. Thus, for every \(K\ge3\), the strict tail event \(\{|M_\tau|>K\}\) is empty up to a null set. Consequently, $$ \sup_{\tau\le T}\mathbb{E}\big[|M_\tau|\mathbf{1}_{\{|M_\tau|>K\}}\big]=0\qquad(K\ge3). $$ This is uniform integrability, so \(M\) is class D. Each \(M_\tau\) is integrable because it is bounded. The argument uses boundedness of the process, not an optional-stopping identity.
Check: at \(K=3\), equality \(|M_\tau|=3\) does not enter the strict tail event. The conclusion remains valid because only values strictly greater than \(K\) are counted.
Why right continuity (or some simultaneous bound) is needed. A bound that holds almost surely at each fixed time does not by itself control \(M_\tau\) at a random time. Let \(U\) be uniform on \((0,1)\), let \(\mathcal{F}_t\) contain \(\sigma(U)\) for every \(t\), and set \(M_0=0\) and \(M_t=U^{-1}\mathbf{1}_{\{U=t\}}\) for \(t>0\). For each fixed \(t\), \(\mathbb{P}(U=t)=0\), so \(M_t=0\) almost surely. Thus \(M\) is a martingale with \(|M_t|\le3\) almost surely at every fixed time. But \(\tau=U\) is a stopping time, and \(M_\tau=U^{-1}\), which is not even integrable because \(\mathbb{E}[U^{-1}]=\int_0^1u^{-1}\,du=\infty\). This process does not have right-continuous paths, and it is not class D on \([0,1]\).
Conditional Expectations Form a UI Family
Proof. Let \(Y=\mathbb{E}[X\mid\mathcal{G}]\) and \(A=\{|Y|>K\}\), which belongs to \(\mathcal{G}\). Conditional Jensen's inequality gives \(|Y|\le\mathbb{E}[|X|\mid\mathcal{G}]\). Hence $$ \mathbb{E}[|Y|\mathbf{1}_A]\le\mathbb{E}[|X|\mathbf{1}_A]. $$ For any \(L>0\), split the right side according to whether \(|X|>L\): $$ \mathbb{E}[|X|\mathbf{1}_A]\le \mathbb{E}[|X|\mathbf{1}_{\{|X|>L\}}]+L\mathbb{P}(A). $$ If \(\mathbb{E}|X|=0\), then \(X=0\) almost surely and all the conditional expectations vanish. Otherwise Markov's inequality and \(\mathbb{E}|Y|\le\mathbb{E}|X|\) give \(\mathbb{P}(A)\le\mathbb{E}|X|/K\). Given \(\varepsilon>0\), integrability permits choosing \(L\) so the first term is less than \(\varepsilon/2\); then choose \(K\) so that \(L\mathbb{E}|X|/K<\varepsilon/2\). Both choices are independent of \(\mathcal{G}\). Thus the tail expectations are uniformly less than \(\varepsilon\), proving the proposition. \(\square\)
This proposition provides a useful route to class D. Suppose \(X\) is integrable and \(M_t=\mathbb{E}[X\mid\mathcal{F}_t]\) has an adapted, right-continuous version on \([0,T]\), with the filtration satisfying the usual conditions. Then \(M\) is a martingale: it is integrable at each time and, for \(s\le t\), the tower property gives \(\mathbb{E}[M_t\mid\mathcal{F}_s]=M_s\). In fact, \(M\) is class D.
To see why stopping times are covered, let \(\tau\le T\) be a stopping time. Approximate it from above by finite-valued stopping times \(\tau_n\) on nested dyadic grids of \([0,T]\), including \(T\); then \(\tau_n\downarrow\tau\). For a finite-valued stopping time \(S\), partitioning over its possible values and using the deterministic-time conditional expectation identity gives \(M_S=\mathbb{E}[X\mid\mathcal{F}_S]\). The proposition therefore makes \(\{M_{\tau_n}:n\ge1\}\) UI. Right continuity gives \(M_{\tau_n}\to M_\tau\) almost surely. The convergence theorem just proved gives convergence in \(L^1\). For every \(A\in\mathcal{F}_\tau\), the stopping-time sigma-field inclusion \(\mathcal{F}_\tau\subseteq\mathcal{F}_{\tau_n}\) implies $$ \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{1}_A M_{\tau_n}]=\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{1}_A X]. $$ Passing to the limit in \(L^1\) gives \(\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{1}_A M_\tau]=\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{1}_A X]\). Since \(M_\tau\) is \(\mathcal{F}_\tau\)-measurable, it is a version of \(\mathbb{E}[X\mid\mathcal{F}_\tau]\). The proposition applied to this conditional expectation shows that the family \(\{M_\tau:\tau\le T\}\) is UI. Thus \(M\) is class D.
Worked Example: A Conditional-Expectation Martingale
Let \(\Omega=\{\omega_1,\omega_2,\omega_3,\omega_4\}\), with probability \(1/4\) on each outcome. Define \(X\) to take the values \(4,0,-2,2\), respectively. Let \(\mathcal{F}_0\) be trivial, let \(\mathcal{F}_1\) reveal whether the outcome is in \(\{\omega_1,\omega_2\}\) or \(\{\omega_3,\omega_4\}\), and let \(\mathcal{F}_2\) reveal the full outcome. Compute \(M_t=\mathbb{E}[X\mid\mathcal{F}_t]\) at these three times.
The unconditional mean is \((4+0-2+2)/4=1\), so \(M_0=1\). On the first \(\mathcal{F}_1\)-atom the conditional mean is \((4+0)/2=2\); on the second it is \((-2+2)/2=0\). At time 2 the value is \(X\). Thus \(M_1\) takes values \(2\) and \(0\), each with probability \(1/2\), and \(M_2\) takes values \(4,0,-2,2\), each with probability \(1/4\). The tower property verifies the martingale identities: \(\mathbb{E}[M_1\mid\mathcal{F}_0]=(2+0)/2=1=M_0\), and \(\mathbb{E}[M_2\mid\mathcal{F}_1]\) is \(2\) on the first atom and \(0\) on the second, exactly \(M_1\).
All values have absolute value at most \(4\), so every stopping-time value on this finite horizon is bounded by \(4\), and the martingale is class D. More generally, the conditional-expectation proposition explains the same conclusion for right-continuous versions of conditional-expectation martingales on a bounded horizon. Check: \(\mathbb{E}[M_2]=(4+0-2+2)/4=1=\mathbb{E}[M_0]\), as required.
Class D Is a Genuine Restriction
Worked Example: A Martingale That Is Not Class D
Let \(U\) be uniform on \((0,1]\), and for integers \(n\ge0\) put \(A_n=\{U\le2^{-n}\}\). Let \(\mathcal{F}_n=\sigma(A_0,\ldots,A_n)\), and define \(M_n=2^n\mathbf{1}_{A_n}\). Verify the martingale property and show that the deterministic-time values are not UI.
For \(n\ge1\), \(A_n\subseteq A_{n-1}\), and \(A_{n-1}\) has probability \(2^{-(n-1)}\). Conditional on \(A_{n-1}\), the event \(A_n\) has probability \(2^{-n}/2^{-(n-1)}=1/2\). Outside \(A_{n-1}\), both \(M_n\) and \(M_{n-1}\) vanish. Therefore \(\mathbb{E}[M_n\mid\mathcal{F}_{n-1}]=2^n(1/2)\mathbf{1}_{A_{n-1}}=M_{n-1}\). Also, \(\mathbb{E}|M_n|=2^n2^{-n}=1\), so each value is integrable.
For any fixed \(K>0\), choose \(n\) with \(2^n>K\). Then \(\{|M_n|>K\}=A_n\), and $$ \mathbb{E}\big[|M_n|\mathbf{1}_{\{|M_n|>K\}}\big]=2^n\mathbb{P}(A_n)=1. $$ Thus the supremum of the tail expectations is at least \(1\) for every \(K\); the family is not UI.
This example can be viewed in continuous time by setting \(M_t=M_{\lfloor t\rfloor}\) and \(\mathcal{F}_t=\mathcal{F}_{\lfloor t\rfloor}\), where \(\lfloor t\rfloor\) is the greatest integer not exceeding \(t\). The process is right-continuous and is a martingale: between integer times it is constant, and across successive integer intervals the conditional expectation identity is the one just checked. Each deterministic time is a stopping time, so the failure of UI among the \(M_n\) already proves that this process is not class D on \([0,\infty)\). Check: the expectation stays exactly \(1\) at every integer time, while all of that expectation lies on an event of probability \(2^{-n}\) with value \(2^n\). This is the tail concentration that uniform integrability excludes.
A Threshold Pitfall
When using Fatou's lemma to control the tail of a limit, do not assume that the tail indicators converge at the threshold. For example, take constant random variables \(X_n=K+1/n\) and \(X=K\), for \(K>0\). Then \(X_n\to X\), but \(X_n\mathbf{1}_{\{X_n>K\}}\to K\), whereas \(X\mathbf{1}_{\{X>K\}}=0\). The claimed pointwise convergence fails at \(|X|=K\).
The correct argument uses a one-sided inequality: on \(\{|X|>K\}\), convergence implies \(|X_n|>K\) eventually, so \(|X|\mathbf{1}_{\{|X|>K\}}\le\liminf_n |X_n|\mathbf{1}_{\{|X_n|>K\}}\); outside \(\{|X|>K\}\), the left side is zero. Fatou's lemma applies to this inequality, as in the proof above. This distinction matters whenever a strict tail event is used.
Check Your Understanding
For each question, distinguish deterministic-time control from the stronger stopping-time requirement in class D.
- Why does a bound \(|M_t(\omega)|\le C\), valid for all \(t\in[0,T]\) outside one null set, imply that \(\{M_\tau:\tau\le T\}\) is UI?
- In the conditional-expectation proposition, where is the fact that \(A=\{|\mathbb{E}[X\mid\mathcal{G}]|>K\}\) belongs to \(\mathcal{G}\) used?
- What does the convergence theorem imply about \(\mathbb{E}[X_n]\) when \(X_n\to X\) in probability and the family is UI?
- For the nested-event martingale, calculate \(\mathbb{E}[|M_n|\mathbf{1}_{\{|M_n|>K\}}]\) when \(2^n>K\), and explain why this rules out UI.
- Why is pointwise convergence of the strict-tail indicators not guaranteed when \(|X|=K\)?